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Abstract In addressing a question at the semantics-pragmatics interface of
how conditionals in English should be categorised, this paper addresses the
underlying question: what is a conditional? Conditionals in English are very
often associated with the canonical pattern ‘if p then q’. But while the word if
provides a simple function to aid us in expressing our conditional thought, it
goes without saying that conditional thought does not go hand in hand with
the single word if. This paper explores some of the ways that conditionals
may be expressed in English without using if by presenting observations
obtained from the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB) combined with
results from previous empirical studies (e.g. Declerck & Reed 2001). In doing
so, this paper considers the question what exactly it is to be a conditional,
proposing some criteria to guide the categorisation of conditional expressions.
In turn, this paper aims to shed some light as to why conditionals using if
are so often focussed upon.
1 Introduction
This paper aims to extend the investigation into the semantics of natural
language conditionals by addressing the underlying question: what is a con-
ditional? While the word if provides a simple function to express conditional
thought, the class of expressions using if are not wholly representative of con-
ditionals at the level of conceptualisation. This paper explores some of the
ways that conditionals are verbalised in English by presenting observations
obtained from the International Corpus of English combined with results from
previous empirical studies (e.g. Declerck & Reed 2001).
This paper suggests some semantic criteria to guide the categorisation
of expressions when taking observations from the corpus. By assuming that
conditionality is a conceptual notion, it becomes evident that the class of con-
ditionals is broader than much of the literature on if supposes. Furthermore,
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since no lexical item alone can dictate the category of conditionals, this paper
also shows that there is no clear-cut category of conditional expressions.
By adopting semantic contextualism, where the logical form of the utter-
ance may be enriched (e.g. Recanati 2010) or even overridden (e.g. Jaszczolt
2010) to give the speaker’s intended meaning, this paper shows that a condi-
tional may either be expressed overtly via the construction used, or implicitly,
where the intended conditional meaning has to be recovered pragmatically.
There is thus a crucial interaction between semantics and pragmatics in gen-
erating a conditional, since the conditional implicature may be the main, in-
tended meaning (cf. Default Semantics, Jaszczolt 2010). This suggests that
conditionality is dependent on an interaction between various sources of com-
munication, from the lexicon and grammar, to the speaker’s intentions and
the topic of conversation.
Finally, while conditionals may be expressed either directly or indirectly,
this paper shows that in each conditional expression there is an underlying
expression which uses if. Since in all conditional expressions if is present
as a concept, utterances using if express conditional thought directly using
the default, most common conditional marker. This paper thus shows how
conditionals which overtly use if fit into a broader semantic category.
2 Criteria for classifying conditionals
In order to grasp how conditionals are expressed in English, we must first
obtain a better grasp of what exactly a conditional is. I start by outlining
three standard ways of approaching the study of conditionals before proposing
some criteria that may guide the classification of conditionals in English.
2.1 Conditionals in logic
The construction ‘if p then q ’ is said to be the natural language equivalent of
the material conditional p Ñ q. The material conditional is truth functional,
in that the conditional is false if and only if the antecedent p is true and the
consequent q is false. The most commonly cited problems in classing natural
language conditionals with material conditionals stem from the fact that the
truth function states that a false antecedent is sufficient for the truth of a
conditional. For example, inputting (1) into the truth function yields a true
conditional, but is deemed to be intuitively false or unassertable in ordinary
discourse.
(1) If grass is blue, then grass is green.
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Some of these reported problems pose genuine concerns when constructing
a definition of natural language conditionals. However, it should be noted
that this paper is concerned with actual usage of conditionals. Therefore,
with the aim of observing natural language communication, spurious examples
which would not be asserted by a rational communicator, such as (1), are not
considered a concern.
Among potentially genuine concerns are cases where the results obtained
by the truth function conflict with speakers’ intuitive truth conditions. Take
(2).
(2) I’m pretty sure John is at home, but if he’s not, he’s still at the office.
Here we are presented with a situation where the speaker believes the an-
tecedent of the conditional to be false. However, interlocutors do not blindly
accept the conditional because of the falsity of the antecedent; rather, the an-
tecedent is entertained as a possibility on which to evaluate the consequent.
If we take the truth function as a starting point for defining conditionality, we
would have to look at the truth values of the parts of the expression to see if
the pattern fits the truth function. Since, intuitively, many natural language
if -statements do not match the truth conditions of the material conditional,
it is likely that conditionals which do not use if will be even more difficult to
elicit if we take a truth-functional approach.
2.2 Conditionals and possible-worlds semantics
With the discrepancies between the material conditional and natural language
conditionals as motivation, Stalnaker (1975) takes a variant truth-conditional
approach to the study of conditionals, arguing that if bears a non-truth-
functional relation between its antecedent and consequent. In particular, he
argues that a conditional is true if and only if in the closest contextually
available possible world in which the antecedent is true the consequent is also
true.
This account fares better than the truth-functional account in following
the pattern of our conditional thought in that it restricts our consideration of
the consequent to those situations where the antecedent holds. Immediately
we have a more intuitive notion of what a conditional is. However, what
should be noted here is that Stalnaker does not provide us with a definition
for what a conditional is, but an account of the truth conditions of already
established conditionals. Therefore, on the one hand we do not have a method
of deciding whether an expression is conditional, but secondly, this account is
only relevant to conditional assertions and won’t adequately extend to other
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conditional speech acts which are not concerned with truth. We thus require
some definition of conditionals which subsume both conditional assertions and
conditional speech acts, and furthermore, a definition which will allow us to
decide whether an expression falls into the class of conditional expressions.
2.3 Conditionals in grammar
The two approaches outlined above are both truth-conditional accounts of
conditionals. However, as we have seen, this will not be helpful in deciding
what counts as a conditional. What is needed is an appropriate definition from
which we can find principles for delimitation. In his Dictionary of Grammatical
Terms, Trask (1992) describes the term ‘conditional’ as:
A conventional name for certain verb forms occurring in some
languages, notably Romance languages, which typically express
some notion of remoteness, supposition, approximation or im-
plied conditional.
By defining a conditional as ‘certain verb forms’ which express an ‘implied
conditional’, it would appear that there is an element of circularity to this def-
inition. Nevertheless, there are more important problems when applying this
definition to the current endeavour. Since English does not have any particular
tense or inflection depicting conditional mood, to specify that conditionality
refers to verb forms is not an appropriate definition when applying to con-
ditionals in English. While we could talk of the conditional tense in English
being expressed with would, it is obvious that we can construct conditional
sentences which do not use would, and moreover that would is not only used
to introduce a conditional. What is required is some definition that will sub-
sume the relevant constructions, but will not limit conditional expressions to
specific verb forms.
One aspect of Trask’s definition which may prove fruitful in shaping our
own definition of conditionals is the notion of ‘remoteness’. Employing a
Gricean (1967) tack, use of the word if typically signifies that the speaker
does not know the antecedent to be certainly true, and gives rise to a quantity
implicature that the speaker is not in a position to make a stronger statement,
for example using since in place of if. We want to extend this rationale to
other conditionals which do not use if. While if may signify some inherent
remoteness from reality, pinning remoteness on the antecedent more generally
removes the burden from the word if. It should also be noted that by bring-
ing in a notion of remoteness from reality, we implicitly consider the speaker’s
epistemic stance towards the truth of the antecedent. This turns the focus
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away from a grammatical definition of conditionals towards a pragmatic defi-
nition, where the speaker’s intentions and context of utterance also have to be
taken into consideration.
2.4 Proposed criteria for classifying conditionals
The discussion so far has looked at three standard ways of approaching the
study of natural language conditionals. While none of the above is appropriate
as a definition of conditionals in English, it has been seen that aspects of each
may contribute to the definition that we require. Here I propose two criteria
that should be sufficient for delimiting the class of conditional expressions.
2.4.1 Antecedent is a supposition
Following the possible-worlds approach of Stalnaker (1975), the truth of the
consequent is only evaluated in those situations that the antecedent invokes.
Extending this idea beyond cases of conditional assertion, the first criterion is
that the antecedent should restrict the consideration of the consequent to the
situation the antecedent specifies. This consideration of the consequent need
not be in terms of truth and falsity, but may be in terms of the felicity of the
main clause utterance. Taking Austin’s (1961) example (3), we have a case
where the consequent is true in all possible worlds, not just the world where
the addressee wants a biscuit.
(3) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.
In this case, the antecedent provides the situation of discourse where the con-
sequent is felicitously uttered, and in this case, denotes the relevance of the
main clause utterance. It is for this reason that Austin’s ‘biscuit conditionals’
are often dubbed ‘relevance conditionals’ in the literature.
2.4.2 Antecedent expresses remoteness
We can now bring the notion of remoteness into the mix. So far, a conditional
expresses some relation between two states where the consequent is dependent
on the supposition of some condition. The second criterion adds that the truth
of that condition should be deemed to be uncertain by the speaker. That is,
in terms of a conditional’s antecedent and consequent, the antecedent of a
conditional is not known to be factual, but the conditional itself is true if, on
the supposition of the antecedent, the consequent is true.
As discussed above, this criterion is pragmatic in that it inevitably has
to take the speaker’s epistemic stance towards the situation described in the
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antecedent into consideration. Thus, there is unlikely to be a one-to-one cor-
respondence between any kind of morpho-syntactic properties of particular
expressions and the class of conditionals, since the judgement for being condi-
tional will stem in part from the speaker’s own judgement in the certainty of
the antecedent.
3 Using ICE-GB to search for conditionals
Individually, these criteria do not state anything novel about conditionals
themselves, but taken together as a definition of a conditional, we are now
in a stronger position to judge the conditionality of individual expressions.
Before detailing the kinds of conditionals to be found in the ICE-GB, it is first
worth considering the form that these conditionals might be found in.
3.1 Conditionality: a semantic or pragmatic notion?
It has been noted above that while the lexicon may provide a tool for overtly
expressing the cognitive function of conditional thought - namely with if -
it is not clear that there will be a one-to-one correspondence between con-
ditional expressions and conditional thoughts. That is, since the criteria for
being conditional do not come directly from the language system itself, this
definition does not limit the level at which conditionality may arise. Following
the semantic theory of contextualism, where the logical form of the utterance
may be enriched (e.g. Recanati 2010) or even overridden (e.g. Jaszczolt 2010)
to give the speaker’s intended meaning, it is possible that a conditional may
either be expressed overtly via the construction used, or implicitly via a con-
ditional implicature. Moreover, even in cases where the utterance is deemed
conditional in virtue of its logical form, we may have cases where the primary
intended meaning is conditional, as is typically the case with conditional as-
sertions, but secondly we may have cases where the primary meaning is not
conditional, as is the case with Austin’s ‘biscuit conditional’ discussed above,
where the main illocutionary force is not assertion. Thus, these criteria do
not limit the extent to which we can go into pragmatic inference in delimiting
conditionals.
Adopting a contextualist stance, we may concede that sometimes the most
appropriate way to convey the intended message is through an implicature, not
through what is said in the sentence. The upshot for distinguishing conditional
expressions is that they will not be limited to using particular lexical items
in that they are not solely dependent on a single word such as if, nor will
they be dependent on specific grammatical constructions, in that there is no
particular structure that a conditional expression must follow. Rather, we
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have to look at various sources of information such as the speaker’s intentions,
topic of conversation and speaker’s background assumptions in order to gauge
whether an expression is conditional or not. It is precisely for the reason that
conditionality is framed by cognition, that classifying conditional expressions
is likely to be a difficult and slippery task.
3.2 Challenges to a corpus study
First, since conditionality could arise at either the level of the sentence or as an
implicature, it should be borne in mind that it is unlikely that there will be a
clear, finite category of conditional expressions. This is for the two reasons that
first, there is possibly an endless number of ways of expressing conditionals
and thus the category would be very open, and second, that any morpho-
syntactic properties of a particular expression which may be used to express
a conditional could plausibly serve other functions in addition to expressing
conditionality, such as to perform speech acts other than assertion. In this
case, the best that we can hope for is a partial list of the various ways that
conditionals may be expressed in English.
In terms of methodology, it must be remembered that grammar and the
lexicon alone will not dictate the category of conditionals. However, short of
conducting a full manual search of the corpus, it is still most efficient to search
for first, individual words, and second, particular grammatical structures in
order to find conditional expressions. Thus, when using the corpus to look
at the variety of conditional expressions available to us in English in terms of
words and structures, it is still necessary to keep the semantic criteria in mind
when deciding what is to be classed as conditional.
Having decided on the semantic criteria for being a conditional, namely
that the antecedent is not known to be true and that the antecedent should
restrict the situations in which the consequent holds, we are now in a position
to start considering how conditional thought may correlate with conditional
expressions. To do this it is necessary to ask the question as to what may count
as a conditional expression which is not denoted by if. To aid in answering
this question, a pilot study using the ICE-GB was conducted, detailed below.
3.3 Pilot study: methodology
In order to gauge a preliminary idea of how conditionals may be verbalised in
English, a pilot study consisting of five conversations from the spoken portion
of ICE-GB was conducted. The spoken portion of this corpus is split into
different discourse contexts. The four main categories are: private dialogue,
public dialogue, unscripted monologue, and scripted monologue. Each cate-
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gory is divided according to the different setting in which the speaking takes
place. For my study, five conversations were chosen using PPS (probability
proportional to size) sampling. This sampling method is useful for the current
purposes, as the probability of selecting any conversation is proportional to the
number of conversations in each category. In this case, PPS sampling was em-
ployed in order to yield conversations over a variety of discourse contexts, yet
ensuring that categories which are more extensively represented in the corpus
were reflected in the sample.
To do this, each conversation was listed in the order that they appear in
the corpus, all of which are pre-grouped by their respective discourse contexts.
A sampling interval was then calculated by taking the number of conversa-
tions in the corpus (300) and dividing by number of conversations required
for the sample (5). A random number between 1 and 60 was then generated
using an online random number generator, yielding the number 37. The 37th
conversation was thus chosen to be analysed, and each conversation there-
after at intervals of 60. The resulting five conversations are from the follow-
ing discourse contexts: private dialogue, direct conversation; private dialogue,
telephone call; public dialogue, parliamentary debate; unscripted monologue,
unscripted speech; scripted monologue, broadcast talk.
To get an idea of some of the ways which conditionals may be externalised
in English, I manually searched the five conversations both for conditionals
using if and for any other conditional constructions. The results are shown in
Table 1.
Total conditionals 61
Conditionals using if 28
Conditionals not using if 33
Table 1
These results show that within the five analysed conversations, over half
of the instances of conditionals do not use if. This highlights that a study of
if would only account for approximately half of all conditionals. Nevertheless,
yielding 46% of all conditionals over the five conversations, it is clear that using
if is by far the dominant way that conditionals are expressed. This provides
some justification for the abundance of literature which focuses on if. However,
as will become evident, there is also a plethora of ways that conditionals may be
formed without using if. It is worth looking at some of these other conditional
expressions, to confirm that the concept of conditionality is not as clear cut
as a study of if would suppose.
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4 Examples of conditional expressions
The examples to be discussed below have been divided into first, words or
phrases that introduce conditionals, and second, structures that give rise to
conditionals.
4.1 Conditional words and phrases: when
First, within the five analysed conversations, the only lexical item which can
seemingly substitute for if is when. There are five conditional when utterances
in total. An example is (4).
(4) When you follow that through you’ve got the means to give rise to a
change in the method. (ICE-GB)
In this example, use of when is not necessarily signalling factuality, but
is rather describing a hypothetical situation. In this case, when can be seen
as expressing a general condition, and is equivalent to whenever. In their
empirical investigation of conditionals, Declerck & Reed (2001:32) call such
when-clauses ‘case-specifying’ clauses, in that they specify a case in which
the proposition in the consequent applies. They suggest that in such cases
when means in a case when, and if could be substituted freely. Recalling
our criteria for being conditional, it appears that this use of when will adhere
to these criteria. This is since the when-clause has an element of hypothet-
ical or remoteness from reality. When the surrounding conversation is taken
into consideration, it becomes evident that the event in the when-clause is
not considered to certainly occur, but rather is being expressed to assert the
consequence should that event occur. In this case, there does not appear to
be any particular semantic difference between if and when, and paraphrasing
(4) with if instead of when would not alter the conditional meaning of the
utterance.
While (4) may be classed as a conditional, it should be noted that it is
only conjunctive uses of when which may qualify as exhibiting conditional use.
In general, when differs from if in that it expresses factuality, as in (5).
(5) Of course everybody thought he was quite mad but when he lifted a
huge block of stone and lifted it above his head then they realised
that he was inspired by a great force. (ICE-GB)
Here, when signals that the event actually occurred. This is made manifest
by the when-clause being the past tense; it is clear that the speaker does not
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intend to invoke any possibility of alternatives. This is in contrast to (4),
where when does not invoke such a sense of factuality.
Whether (4) and (5) are conditionals is reasonably clear. However, decid-
ing whether utterances meet the criteria becomes more slippery when consid-
ering examples such as (6).
(6) How can I demonstrate a machine when it doesn’t work properly?
(Declerck & Reed 2001:33)
The use of when in (6) is arguably case-specifying since it provides the case
that the content of the consequent applies. Moreover, when can be substituted
for in a case when. However, here the antecedent is deemed to be factual, and
so by our criterion, should not be classed as a conditional. Declerck & Reed
(2001:33) suggest that this case-specifying when can be substituted for if, even
though the antecedent is deemed to be factual. Declerck & Reed do not discuss
any criteria for when when may felicitously be exchanged for if, but an initial
hypothesis may be that conditionality is dependent on the intended temporal
reference. As noted above, the past temporal reference of the when-clause in
(5) denotes its factuality. However, (6) does not denote a specific time, but a
general state of affairs. This leaves open the possibility for its refutation. The
question becomes whether or not the when-clause is intended to leave open
the possibility of alternatives, or whether it is supposed to be taken as factual.
It is thus the speaker’s intended meaning and epistemic stance towards the
when-clause that will determine its conditional status.
As noted above, if invokes a hypothetical state and leaves open the possi-
bility of alternatives. If substituting if for when in (6) would leave the utter-
ance semantically unchanged, this would suggest that when does not express
factual information, and hence that (6) and (7) have the same conditional
sense.
(7) How can I demonstrate a machine if it doesn’t work properly?
While if is usually said to invoke alternatives, it should be noted that the
if -clause in (7) also appears to be true. Does this mean that factual if -clauses
do not invoke conditionals? A possible response may be that the reason that
the if -clause in (7) is deemed to be true is because it is used to echo a previous
thought or utterance in the conversation (cf. Carston 1996). In this case, the
truth of the if -clause is presupposed by attributing the utterance to a previous
thought or utterance in the conversation. If the truth of the if -clause is taken
for granted, by our criterion of remoteness from reality, (7) should not be
considered truly conditional.
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Dancygier & Sweetser (2000) consider this argument but with reference to
the differences between since and if. Similar to when, the affinities between
since and if are evident from (8), taken from Dancygier & Sweetser (2000:119),
and paraphrased using if in (9).
(8) Since you’re a linguist, what’s the Russian word for ‘blender’?
(9) If you’re a linguist, what’s the Russian word for ‘blender’?
While Dancygier & Sweetser acknowledge that if can be used echoically,
they stress that since expresses positive epistemic stance; it represents factual
information. On the other hand, if always invokes neutral epistemic stance in
that it does not mark any commitment to the truth of its clause. They state:
Rather than setting up a novel space, they rif -clausess evoke a
space already contextually accessible. However, referring to a
space available in previous discourse does not necessarily mean
that the speaker always aligns herself with its content to the
same degree. . . if indicates non-commitment to the clause it
marks: but non-commitment covers a wide range of possible
attitudes, from strong disbelief to near-commitment. (Dancy-
gier & Sweetser 2000:127)
For them, the fundamental difference between if and since is that since
presupposes definite truth of the clause, while if maintains an element —
however strong or weak — of alternatives. Thus, while the content of an if -
clause may be echoic, by using if rather than since the speaker suggests she
is not committing her belief in its truth. Rather, as Dancygier & Sweetser
(2000:130) suggest, if may be used to denote that the utterance is attributed
to another person, or that the speaker reserves judgement on its truth. In this
way, they suggest that if is used as quotative, which is more polite than using
since. Utilising this rationale, we may conclude that (8) is not conditional due
to its factual antecedent, while (9) may be considered conditional on the basis
that the speaker is not committed to the truth of its antecedent.
We can apply this argument to the case of when in (6). Although the
temporal reference of (6) may allow when to be substituted with if, there is
nevertheless a subtle semantic difference between them. Use of when in (6)
suggests that the speaker believes the state in the clause to be certainly true;
using Dancygier & Sweetser’s terminology, when invokes positive epistemic
state. However, in the cases where when is replaced with if, there is the in-
dication that the speaker is not committed to the truth of the clause, but
is attributing the utterance to a previous thought or utterance. Finally, it
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appears that both when and since in these seemingly factual cases denote a
reason for the assertion of the main clause; they are not invoking a condition.
While when may sometimes invoke some remoteness from reality, it is impor-
tant to adhere to the semantic criteria and not to allow the lexicon to guide
conditionality. Therefore, such factual cases of when cannot be counted as con-
ditionals owing to their positive epistemic stance, while their if counterparts
still invoke some possibility of alternatives.
It is interesting to note that this discussion has highlighted that there may
not be a clear factual versus non-factual distinction between conditional and
non-conditional expressions. Rather, there may be a gradation of certainty
from absolute certainty — where since tends to fall — to complete impossibil-
ity. The cases of if described here which may substitute in a when- or since-
clause appear to fall around the boundary between certain and non-certain.
Moreover, the case of when also confirms that conditionality does not hinge on
the lexical item alone. While conjunctive when may sometimes invoke some
remoteness from certainty, recovering the strength of certainty is due to an
interaction between the lexical item and other factors, such as the temporal
reference of the clause and other utterances in the conversation. This inter-
action from several sources suggests that contextualism is, in fact, the correct
semantics to adopt, because we cannot rely on the lexicon alone to recover the
intended meaning.
This observation also has some ramifications for the pursuit of delimiting
conditional constructions. While English has a default conditional marker, if,
other words which may perform the same function — such as when —may also
be used in other roles other than to mark conditionality. Because conditionality
may arise through an interaction of various sources of information and thus
may not be evident from the logical form or construction of the utterance
alone, it is obvious that there will be no clear-cut category of conditional
expressions. However, what also becomes obvious is that attempting to devise
a list of potentially searchable items for a corpus investigation is not a plausible
task, as there is also no clear-cut class of conditional constructions, where
conditionality is introduced by some particular word or phrase.
4.2 Other conditional words and phrases
Since when was the only overt conditional conjunction found in this pilot
study, I now turn to Declerck & Reed’s (2001) empirical investigation, where
they provide an extensive list of possible conditional constructions. Declerck &
Reed (2001:9) opt to define conditionality in terms of the form of the sentence,
stating that a conditional is “a two-clause structure in which one of the clauses
is introduced by if r. . . s or by a word or phrase that has a meaning similar
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to if.” However, through their examples they describe some non-conditional
constructions as having some ‘conditional connotation’ (e.g. Declerck & Reed
2001:28), suggesting that conditionality comes through meaning rather than
form, as they had suggested. Nevertheless, regardless of their definition of a
conditional, Declerck & Reed’s study provides a useful backdrop that can be
used as the basis for the discussion of what may potentially be classed as a
conditional.
In addition to non-factual when, some additional examples of conditional
conjunctions that Declerck & Reed list are as follows. First, they suggest
that phrases such as providing, provided (that), on condition that, and on the
understanding that can all express a necessary condition, and may substitute
for if (Declerck & Reed 2001:21). On this basis, I searched the whole spoken
corpus for the following key words, obtaining the following results:
Key word # instances in corpus # of conditional uses
providing 18 3
provided 34 13
condition 27 0
understanding 36 0
Table 2
The potential conditional uses of providing and provided are tagged in the
corpus as conjunctions, opposed to certainly non-conditional uses which are
tagged as verbs, making them easy to elicit. Some conditional examples are:
(10) Why can you not coach every day in half term, providing the children
have half term at the same time? (ICE-GB)
(11) The quickest way into the West End from there is Gospel Oak,
provided you know the times of the trains. (ICE-GB)
Both providing and provided appear to invoke some sense of non-commitment
towards the state that they describe, so fit with the definition of a conditional
given in this paper. Indeed, in (10) it is not taken for granted that the chil-
dren have half term at the same time, nor is it assumed in (11) that the hearer
knows the times of the trains. Rather, each of these clauses serves to provide
a condition, which is itself unknown, on which the main clause is intended to
hold.
That no conditional instances of condition or understanding were found
in the spoken corpus, where the phrase denoting conditionality might be on
condition that, or on the understanding that respectively, highlights a problem
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with focusing on one corpus for a comprehensive description of all conditional
uses in English. Since sentences using such phrases sound natural and occur
in ordinary discourse, it is not that such phrases are not used in English, but
that the corpus does not contain any instances. This confirms that manually
searching the corpus for conditional constructions can only yield a partial
picture of how conditionals may be expressed in natural language.
The second observation of Declerck & Reed’s that I discuss is with unless.
Declerck & Reed (2001:21) suggest that unless is usually understood as being
equivalent to ‘in a case other than’, and in non-counterfactual conditionals,
unless can be substituted by except if.1 What can be seen from searching the
spoken ICE-GB for cases of unless, is that unless invokes uncertainty on the
truth of the clause it introduces. There are 67 cases of unless in the spoken
corpus, an example of which is (12).
(12) You’re very unlikely to get someone to commission you to write
something unless you’ve already written and published quite a lot
(which I haven’t). (ICE-GB)
Here, it can be seen that unless provides a situation which is temporarily
assumed to be uncertain, although the speaker later refutes this possibility of
alternatives in the following utterance. Unless differs from if in that the use
of unless conjoins the meaning of if with not, resulting in the negation of
the unless-clause providing the condition for the main clause, as exemplified
in (13).
(13) If you haven’t already written and published quite a lot, you’re very
unlikely to get someone to commission you to write something.
Here we have unless serving to restrict the situations in which the main
clause assertion is intended to hold. This is essentially the same role that if
plays, except that it provides the opposite effect: if suggests that the asser-
tion is only deemed to hold true in the situations that the if -clause specifies,
while unless denotes that the main clause assertion holds in all situations ex-
cept those the unless-clause specifies. We therefore have both the sense of
remoteness from certainty and restriction to particular situations from the
subordinate clause that conditionality requires.
1 See Declerck & Reed (2000) for a detailed discussion of unless.
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4.3 The case of in case
The final case in the discussion of conditional words and phrases that I address
is that of in case. Declerck & Reed (2001:21-5) list five different ways in which
in case may be used, all of which they suggest have some conditional mean-
ing. The following discussion aims to uncover whether this claim is correct
according to the current definition of a conditional.
There are just 13 tokens of in case in the spoken ICE-GB, which are
grouped by Declerck & Reed’s classification in the table below.
Total instances of in case 13
Precautionary 8
Preventative 1
Reason for emotion 0
If it is the case that 1
Relevance 2
Insufficient data to classify 1
Table 3
The first case is where in case has a precautionary meaning, where the
speaker describes an action taken as a precaution against a potential conse-
quence.
(14) I kept it in case he wanted to see it. (ICE-GB)
(15) I got my sleeping bag r. . . s in case I needed to be there for some
reason. (ICE-GB)
Here, in case suggests that the speaker is unsure of whether the event will
occur or not, and thus evokes some remoteness from reality. Thus, under one of
the current criteria, there is a possible conditional meaning. However, in case
does not appear to restrict the cases where the main clause holds. Compare
the following.
(16) I will take an umbrella in case it rains.
(17) I will take an umbrella if it rains.
While if provides the circumstance under which the main clause assertion is
supposed to hold, in case provides a reason for the action, and that reason
is owing to the possibility of rain. It may be possible to draw parallels with
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relevance conditionals, as the in case-clause denotes the relevance of the asser-
tion. However, there seems to be a difference between this case of in case and
if -relevance conditionals in that in the latter, the if -clause is said to create
the discourse setting where the utterance is relevant, while the in case-clause
here provides the reason for the action. Thus, whether we class this example
as conditional will depend on the reason for the utterance: whether in case
serves to provide information about the rationale for the speaker’s actions,
or whether it denotes the relevance for uttering the main clause. The former
seems more plausible.
The second use of in case which Declerck & Reed describe has a preven-
tative meaning, describing a situation which has not taken place in order to
prevent a potential consequence.
(18) She never let the child play in the street in case he was run over.
(Declerck & Reed 2001:23)
As with the precautionary meaning, in case does not provide a restriction on
the situation described in the main clause, but rather provides the reason for
the habitual action.
Third, in case may be used after expressions of fear or apprehension, and
introduces a complement clause to denote the reason for the emotion. In this
way, in case is equivalent to that.
(19) She was concerned in case her cover was blown. (Declerck & Reed
2001:23)
As with the previous two ways of using in case, in case introduces a reason
for the main clause eventuality, and thus the main clause is not restricted to
particular circumstances. While the in case-clause does denote uncertainty,
further information than the structure alone is required to elicit the degree to
which the speaker believes the in case-clause is likely. Paraphrasing (19) in
the following ways highlights this.
(20) She was concerned what would happen if her cover was blown.
(21) She was concerned because it was probable that her cover was blown.
In (20) it may be assumed that the if -clause refers to a potential future
event (but note that the if -clause is a condition for what would happen, not
the event of being concerned). On the other hand, (21) provides an overt
reason for being concerned, because the eventuality in the subordinate clause
is considered to be likely. Thus, as with the case of when discussed above,
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we would appear to have a cline between certainty and uncertainty in the in
case-clause.
Fourth, in case can be used to give rise to the phrase if it is the case that.
(22) In case you need any money, I can lend you some. (Declerck & Reed
2001:23)
(23) In case you have any problems, your enumerator has been trained to
help. (ICE-GB)
In these cases, Declerck & Reed (2001:24) suggest that in case is ‘actualisation-
conditioning’, meaning that the antecedent denotes the situation which trig-
gers the situation in the consequent. As above, in case appears to denote a
possible future situation, thus leaving open the certainty of its actualisation.
However, in this case in case could potentially be classed as conditional, as it
provides a restricted situation in which the main clause is intended to hold.
It should be noted that both (22) and (23) could be considered speech-act
conditionals, as the truth of the main clause is not restricted to the situation
described in the in case-clause. Focussing on (23), it appears that we could
get several readings depending on the intended meaning of the utterance. On
the one hand, training has already occurred, so in case may be providing
a reason why the training occurred in the past. Under this interpretation,
as with the previous kinds of in case, there will be no conditional meaning.
Alternatively, as with (16), in case may be a kind of relevance conditional,
providing a felicity condition for the main clause assertion. Finally, in case
may denote a conditional proper, but requires enriching to get the conditional
meaning, as in (24). Here the utterance would be intended as a conditional
directive, but is only recovered through the conditional implicature.
(24) If you have any problems, go to your enumerator.
We thus have another case where the speaker’s primary meaning will provide
the relevant interpretation, and in turn will depend on whether the utterance
is conditional or not. This reinforces the difficulties with placing conditionality
on a lexical item alone.
Finally, in case may be used to express relevance.
(25) In case you’re wondering, that’s not to the loo. (ICE-GB)
Here in case provides a situation which denotes the relevance of asserting the
main clause. This has clear affinities with if -relevance conditionals, where the
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antecedent supplies the relevance of asserting the consequent, even though the
truth of the consequent is not dependent on the truth of the antecedent. It is
only when the antecedent is true that the consequent is appropriately asserted.
In case performs the same role in delimiting the situations in which the main
clause is felicitous, and can be seen as exhibiting conditional meaning in the
same way as if -relevance conditionals.
Related to in case, lest is said to be an alternative to in case in the pre-
ventative sense, although it is only expected to be found in formal or literary
contexts. Indeed, only one case of lest is found in the spoken corpus, which
comes from a scripted lecture:
(26) Yiddish speakers and authors r. . . s often signed their Yiddish pieces
with pseudonyms lest the fact that they had stooped to write in the
colloquial language damaged their reputations. (ICE-GB)
As above, however, this sense of lest is not considered to be conditional, be-
cause it merely provides a reason for an action which is certain, even though
that reason itself is uncertain. In particular, it does not delimit the situation
in which the main clause holds, so does not fit with that criterion for being
conditional.
To sum up so far, while it is obvious that grammar and the lexicon do not
dictate conditionality, this discussion has shown through various examples that
there are nevertheless certain words or phrases that do typically invoke some
conditional sense, even if this conditionality also arises from other aspects of
communication. Therefore, while there is clearly no systematic correspondence
between elements of the English language system and conditional thought, the
lexicon nevertheless plays a part in generating this conditional meaning.
To round off the discussion of various words and phrases that may intro-
duce a conditional, I list the following examples from the ICE-GB.
(27) Suppose you hadn’t been able to raise finance at all.
(28) Supposing she’d said that to a psychiatrist, what would they say?
(29) That is correct assuming his face was pointing forwards.
(30) Let’s assume that was a noun phrase.
(31) Given that linguistics is not democratic, we can’t necessarily accept
that.
Each of these examples restricts the situations that the hearer is asked
to consider, and secondly, these situations are expressed with an element of
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uncertainty. Each of these thus appears to fit with the current concept of a
conditional. Other possible expressions may be the exhortative let’s assume
or say, and imperative imagine (Declerck & Reed 2001:26). It should be noted
that the exhortative and imperative versions of suppose and assume form a
syntactically independent clause, thus making for two independent sentences
rather than conjoined ones. While each of these examples has a particular
lexical item that may invoke a conditional sense, we can see that there is no
definite line between a conditional with an overt conditional conjunction, and
a conditional construction which is not a conjoined conditional sentence.
The following discussion turns to conditional constructions which do not
have an overt conditional conjunction, but whose conditionality may be elicited
in part through their clausal constructions.
4.4 Conditional expressions with no conditional conjunction
In the pilot study of five conversations detailed above, there were three in-
stances where the grammatical structure gives rise to a conditional reading in
light of having the form of a coordinate sentence. Following Haiman (1983) I
call these ‘paratactic conditionals’.
(32) Here on this dry desert it’s searing, but mix it with a little water and
life flourishes. (ICE-GB)
Paratactic conditionals are obviously not identified by the conjunction and,
but can be elucidated by the conditional criteria. In particular, it is the fact
that the first conjunct is not put forward as a statement of truth, and secondly
that the situation described in the second conjunct is dependent on that of
the first conjunct, that we are able to interpret the conditional meaning of the
utterance.
The second construction found in the five conversations is one case where
a restrictive relative clause could function as the if -clause:
(33) Let me also point out what could happen to companies that don’t
innovate. (ICE-GB)
Here, the sentence is not semantically a conditional, because ‘companies that
don’t innovate’ is a description, not a condition. However, it is possible that
with pragmatic enrichment conditional meaning could be uncovered, and could
be paraphrased as (34).
(34) Let me also point out what could happen to companies if they don’t
innovate.
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The conditionality may come from the speech act or purpose of the ut-
terance, which in this case may be to provide a warning against potential
consequences of not innovating. It should also be noted that it is only the
paraphrased if -clause which gives rise to the possibility of alternatives. Use
of if does not assume that any particular company is innovative or not, but
rather, it provides the situation in which the main clause holds. This enriched
utterance is thus clearly conditional. However, it should be noted that it is
only when the if -clause is taken to be true that the sentence can be felici-
tously translated using that, as in (33). This provides further evidence that
conditionality may arise at the level of pragmatic inference, and need not be
overt from the logical form alone. Thus, the main message intended by the
speaker may be different from the uttered sentence, as it may be the enriched
or modulated proposition which is the primary meaning (cf. Recanati 2010).
Fillmore (1990:141) briefly suggests that the following grammatical con-
structions give rise to alternative worlds:
(35) Do you like it? It’s yours.
(36) With his hat on he would look older.
(37) Then / In that case / Otherwise (etc.), I wouldn’t be here.
Fillmore does not discuss in virtue of what components or structures these
examples invoke alternative possibilities. However, it can be conjectured that
first, in (35), the nature of a question is to invite alternative possibilities. It
is then the assumption of the affirmative which allows the conclusion to be
drawn. This can easily be seen as conveying an underlying conditional, which
may be paraphrased as (38).
(38) If you like it, it’s yours.
We thus have conditionality arising at the level of implicature, which high-
lights that the consequent is only deemed to hold on the assumption of the
antecedent. However, it should be noted that the main message of this utter-
ance is presumably not conditional at all, but is intended to convey (39).
(39) You can have it.
This is a clear example of how conditionality may arise at the level of impli-
cature, but is itself a conversational device used to trigger further pragmatic
inference to yield the speaker’s intended message.
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In (36) we have our first counterfactual construction. It is presupposed by
the tense and mood of the modal verb that the man does not currently have
his hat on, and moreover, ‘with his hat on’ provides the situation in which
the conclusion is deemed to hold. By following the pattern of our conditional
thought, it appears that (36) directly expresses conditionality without any
pragmatic inference. Nevertheless, the sentence can be paraphrased using if
to highlight its conditional meaning.
(40) If he had his hat on he would look older.
Similarly in (37), it is the modal verb which gives rise to the feeling of
the impossibility of the truth of the assertion. The anaphoric devices pro-
vide the situation which denotes the belief in the consequent. However, these
devices alone do not give rise to the possibility of alternatives; rather, there
is an implied indirect conditional thought which is expressed. This may be
paraphrased as:
(41) If that were the case, I wouldn’t be here.
It should be noted that it is the element of complete counterfactuality as
supposed by the speaker which is generated by the modal verb which gives
rise to a possible indicative versus subjunctive conditional distinction. It is
common to all conditionals that there is an element of uncertainty in the
antecedent. While there may be a gradation from near-certainty to complete
disbelief in an indicative, what is apparently unique to subjunctives is the
belief in its impossibility. Thus, it is not the fact that an antecedent may give
rise to the possibility of alternatives which gives rise to its conditionality, but
simply in its uncertainty. A subjunctive conditional thus holds the extreme
end of the spectrum.
5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed some criteria to guide the classification of condi-
tionals. Through discussion of various examples found in the ICE-GB which
adhere to these criteria, this paper has also highlighted that conditionality
may arise at any level of communication, be it from the logical form of the
uttered sentence, through pragmatic enrichment, or by overriding the logical
form of the utterance altogether. While the lexicon and grammar may have
a role to play, it has been seen that conditionality may be formed through an
interaction of different sources of communication conspiring to generate the
intended conditional meaning. Because there is no one-to-one correspondence
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between particular constructions and conditional thought, it is no surprise that
conditionals can be expressed in such a wide variety of ways.
It has been suggested that inherent in the meaning of the word if is an
appeal to alternatives. Therefore, regardless of whether a conditional is ex-
pressed directly through functions of grammar or the lexicon, or indirectly,
where the intended conditional meaning has to be recovered pragmatically, in
each conditional expression there is an underlying expression which can use
if. If we accept that in all conditional expressions if is present as a concept,
we can suggest that utterances using if simply express conditional thought
directly, using the default, most common conditional marker. This paper has
thus shown how conditionals using if fit in the broader semantic category.
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